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1. Introduction: How important is the increase in capital mobility?  
Influenced by the hype about globalisation many observers take it for granted that the 
degree of capital mobility has increased substantially during the last decades and that 
capital markets are more integrated today compared to any previous period in history. 
The empirical evidence, however, is not as clear-cut. In this section we briefly survey 
this evidence.  
There is a very large literature following up on the seminal paper of Feldstein and 
Horioka (1980). Feldstein and Horioka reasoned that, in a world of perfectly mobile 
capital, domestic savings would seek out the highest returns in the world capital 
market independent of local investment demand. By the same mechanism, world 
capital market should serve as a source of financing for domestic investment needs. 
Thus, if capital markets are integrated, t he investment ratio (investments/GDP) 
should be independent of the savings ratio. Feldstein and Horioka argued that the 
correlation between investment and saving in a cross-section of countries might 
provide a test of global (or international) capital mobility. They found that this 
correlation was very high in the post-war period, indicating that the degree of capital 
mobility was not substantial.  
Subsequent econometric research has confirmed the high correlation between 
savings and investment ratios in cross-country regressions. However, it has also 
been stressed by several researchers that a high correlation between savings and 
investment ratios may not necessarily signal a low degree of financial integration
1. 
Two alternative explanations have been advanced. The first one is that common 
factors such as population growth, output changes or productivity shocks may 
determine investment and savings simultaneously. When these common shocks 
occur the two variables are cointegrated and automatically exhibit a high correlation. 
This will be the case even if capital markets are fully integrated. The second 
explanation relies on the fact that economic policies tend to be similar across 
countries. Policymakers in most countries may seek to attain approximate current 
account balance. This goal can be achieved through appropriate monetary and fiscal 
policies. If cross-country targets are similar then the high correlation of savings and 
investments across countries follows automatically.  
                                                 
1 See: Obstfeld (1986), Summers H. (1988), Barro, Mankiw, Sala-i-Martin (1992), Frankel (1991).    3
One conclusion from the vast literature is that the original Feldstein-Horioka test is not 
informative, since conventional cross-sectional regressions are likely to produce high 
saving-investment correlations, regardless of whether the degree of international 
capital mobility is high or low
2. 
In addition to its methodological and econometric problems, the Feldstein-Horioka 
econometric test does not produce a benchmark that can indicate low or high 
integration. Even if the Feldstein-Horioka criterion measures integration properly and 
the econometrics yields a proper estimate, we are still left without a yardstick telling 
us what is “high” and what is “low”. However, potentially useful information can be 
obtained by analysing the changes over time in the correlation between savings and 
investment. Such an analysis has been done by Taylor (1996)
3. Using a modified F-H 
measure, Taylor found a lower correlation among high-income countries. In addition, 
his analysis uncovered a general decline in the correlation (higher integration of 
markets) from 1980 onwards. Taylor concludes that in this modified framework, 
international markets do exhibit a recent tendency towards increased integration. 
Although this conclusion seems plausible, it is subject to a similar criticism as the one 
levelled against the original Feldstein-Horioka result. The decline in the correlation 
observed since 1980 could be due to a decline in the importance of common shocks.   
Recently economists have taken a long historical view to analyse the question of 
whether capital mobility has increased. A surprising finding is that net capital flows 
(as measured by the current account) tended to be of the same order of magnitude 
during the period of the international gold standard as compared to the present 
period. This has been confirmed by Zevin (1992), Sachs and Warner (1995) and 
Rodrik (1998), leading to the conclusion that today’s degree of capital market 
openness is nothing particular as compared to the situation a century ago. Using US 
data, Eichengreen (1999) has claimed, however, that the present degree of financial 
integration has increased relative to one hundred years ago.  
To sum up, the degree of financial market integration today is not dramatically higher 
than one hundred years ago. This goes counter the conventional wisdom that exists 
in the popular press and in the large “globalisation literature”. Nevertheless, there 
seems to be evidence that the degree of financial integration in the world has been 
                                                 
2 See Jansen (1996). 
3 See Taylor (1994).   4
increasing in the last few decades. The recent increase leads to many new 
challenges, one of which has to do with the conduct of national monetary and fiscal 
policies.  
2. Implications for monetary and fiscal policies 
There is a general consensus among economists that the increase in capital mobility 
has affected the viability of fixed exchange rate regimes. In particular, it has made the 
fixed exchange rate regime more fragile and less capable of withstanding speculative 
movements. The very fact that speculators expect a future devaluation can 
dramatically increase the cost of defending a fixed exchange rate, giving strong 
incentives to the monetary authorities not to fight the speculators and to devalue. This 
phenomenon has been given theoretical backing in the so-called second generation 
models of speculative attacks
4. In addition, increased capital mobility may have 
intensified the contagious effects of crises
5. As a result, the increasing integration of 
financial markets has forced more and more countries to move away from fixed 
exchange rate arrangements. This phenomenon is well illustrated in table 1. Since 
1975, the number of developing countries pegging their currencies dropped by half.  
 
Table 1: Developing economies  – evolution of pegged exchange rate 
arrangements. 
 







their currencies  USD  FF  SDR  Other 
currency 
Basket 
1975  88  50  15  12.5  12.5  10 
1986  70  37  27  16  13  7 
1998  43  34  26  21  14  5 
Source: Michael Mussa, Paul Masson, Alexander Swoboda, Esteban Jadresic, Paolo Mauro, 
and Andy Berg "Exchange Rate Regimes in an Increasingly Integrated World Economy", 
IMF, April 2000 
 
The implications of the move away from pegged exchange rates are that countries 
have sought alternative arrangements in drastically different directions. One set of 
countries (the largest part) has sought refuge into more flexible exchange rate 
                                                 
4 See Obstfeld (1996). 
5 See Eichengreen and Wyplosz (1993).   5
regimes. This is shown in table 2. 
 































Pegged to:  45  1.58  51.8  33.6  78 
USD  16  1.20  61.1  29.5  69 
FF  13  2.03  34.4  36.9  100 
Other  8  1.52  63.4  37.2  75 
Basket  8  1.68  53.4  34.1  63 
Flexible:  28  2.15  51.3  34.3  57 
Managed float  11  2.00  69.7  27.7  64 
Independent 
float 













Source: Michael Mussa, Paul Masson, Alexander Swoboda, Esteban Jadresic, Paolo Mauro, 
and Andy Berg "Exchange Rate Regimes in an Increasingly Integrated World Economy", 
IMF, April 2000 
 
Another group of countries has chosen much tighter arrangements than pegged 
exchange rates. The most notable move was made by eleven EU countries that 
decided to abolish their intra-exchange rates altogether and to move into a monetary 
union on January 1, 1999. Other countries sought to tighten up their exchange rate 
arrangements by adopting currency boards.  
The consensus today is that countries have little choice but to move to one of the two 
extremes, i.e. either towards more flexibility or towards more rigidity, because the 
intermediate regime of pegging is not sustainable for long in a world of high capital 
mobility.  
These new policy choices create new challenges for macroeconomic policies that we 
analyse in the next sections.    6
3. The challenge of increased flexibility of the exchange rates. 
The major challenge here is how countries can anchor nominal variables such as the 
price level and the money stock, once the exchange rate anchor has gone. There is 
no doubt that in the past many countries used the fixed exchange rate as the anchor 
for their domestic price level and money stock. In doing so they in fact used the 
services of the leader in the system (for most countries this was the US) who was 
doing the job of explicitly anchoring nominal variables. In a flexible exchange rate 
environment, these countries cannot rely anymore on economic policy of another 
country and have to manage the price level and the money supply themselves.  
The need to anchor nominal variables in a flexible exchange rate environment 
explains the increasing popularity of procedures of explicit inflation targeting. We now 
observe that more and more countries have switched towards inflation targeting. 
Among the industrial countries, seven have adopted inflation targeting during the past 
decade. They are (in chronological order): New Zealand, Canada, the United 
Kingdom, Finland, Sweden, Australia and Spain. With the introduction of the euro on 
January 1, 1999, the central banks of Finland and Spain lost their power to conduct 
independent monetary policy and have transferred it to the European Central Bank. 
All of the listed countries are small or middle-sized open, industrialised economies. 
They have showed a poor record in fighting inflation (for industrialised countries 
standards) over the past 30 years and they were generally perceived to lack 
monetary policy credibility.  
In all these countries, the inflation target is set around 2%. In Australia (and Finland 
before 1999), central bank targets the point objective, while in Canada, New Zealand, 
the UK and Sweden central banks specify a range for the inflation target. The 
Spanish central bank used to specify a ceiling for the inflation rate. 
The empirical evidence indicates that until now inflation targeters have had some 
success in anchoring their domestic price levels. Many issues remain, however. First, 
other industrial countries without explicit inflation targeting procedures have been 
equally successful in reducing inflation. It is, therefore, unclear whether inflation 
targeting is superior to other forms of monetary control. Second, there is the question 
for inflation targeters and others alike of whether the success in reducing inflation is 
sustainable. A subsidiary question is whether the success in stabilising the price level 
will also lead to more stability of the exchange rates. Since price levels are one of the   7
fundamental variables determining exchange rates, one would expect that success in 
stabilising price levels would also tend to stabilise exchange rates. 
The evidence on PPP, however, is weak. This is especially the case for currencies 
experiencing low inflation rates. The recent developments in the euro-dollar exchange 
rate illustrate this point. Inflation differentials between the US and Euroland have 
remained extremely low since the start of EMU. They fluctuated around 1% to 1.5% 
(see fig. 1), while the US dollar appreciated by more than 20% during the same 
period. Surprisingly, it is the US with the appreciating currency, which experienced a 
slightly higher rate of inflation. One can conclude that it is far from certain that price 
stability will do much to stabilise exchange rates. We are likely to have to live with 
significant volatility of the major exchange rates even in a world of price stability.  
This leads to the other challenge for the countries moving towards more exchange 
rate flexibility. The first question that arises in this context is whether countries should 
worry about the kind of exchange rate volatility that such a system implies. The 
second question is whether they can and should do something about this.  
To the first question, the answer seems to be yes, but only when misalignments take 
on large proportions. Examples of such large misalignments have been the dollar 
movements of 1980-85, and the recent movements of the euro-dollar and euro-yen 
rates. It should be stressed that these large misalignments have been relatively rare. 
 
Figure 1. Inflation in the US and Euroland. 
Source: ECB, Monthly Bulletin 
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debated: what can be done about the large swings in the exchange rates? One 
school of thought (represented by Williamson, Bergsten and others) has been arguing 
that agreements to set up looser forms of exchange rate pegs (target zones) are 
called for. In other words, these are proposals aiming at escaping the iron logic of a 
world of capital mobility that drives countries to the extremes of high flexibility or rigid 
fixity.  
It is doubtful that these target zone agreements can survive any better than pegged 
exchange rate systems. Although target zones provide more flexibility than pegged 
rate systems, they suffer from the same weakness, i.e. that the national monetary 
authorities must be willing to subordinate domestic objectives to the external 
constraint of the target zone. To take an example, suppose that today, in June 2000, 
a target zone agreement existed between the US and Euroland. This would be fine 
for Euroland because the euro depreciation would act as a signal for the ECB to 
tighten monetary policy, which it probably wants to do anyway because of the 
inflationary pressures generated by the weak euro. But what about the US? There 
can be no doubt that a target zone agreement today would lead to a major policy 
conflict for the US monetary authorities. The reason is that it would force the US 
monetary authorities to loosen monetary policies to bring down the dollar. Such an 
easy monetary policy, however, would further exacerbate the domestic consumption 
boom and increase inflationary pressures. Faced with such a dilemma, there is no 
doubt that the Fed would choose for its domestic objectives and would not do its part 
of the deal implicit in a target zone agreement. Such conflicts between domestic 
objectives and external constraints would regularly emerge, reducing the credibility of 
the target zone agreement.  
One can conclude that the only cooperative initiatives that have some chance of 
success will be ad-hoc agreements concluded when there is a broad consensus that 
exchange rate movements “have gone too far”, and that it is in the interest of all 
concerned sides to correct these movements. This happened in 1985, and led to the 
Plaza agreement, which was relatively successful in correcting the overvaluation of 
the dollar. Such ad-hoc agreements are all one can wish for in the future. 
4. The challenge of the fixers 
Many countries have decided that the optimal response to greater capital mobility is 
not to go for more flexibility, but to look for tighter fixity in the exchange rate.   9
European countries forming EMU went all the way in this logic and started a 
monetary union. In section 6, we deal with some of the challenges that these 
countries face. In  this section we discuss the experiments of other countries that 
chose to go in the direction of more fixity.  
A significant number of countries have decided to take up a monetary regime - the 
currency board - that seemed to be discredited, since it was linked to colonial times. 
Surprisingly, countries that have chosen this monetary regime seem to have 
performed relatively well compared to other countries choosing a different fixed 
exchange rate regime. This has been documented in a recent IMF study
6. The study 
compared inflation and output in countries operating under different exchange rate 
arrangements (a currency board, a fixed exchange rate regime and flexible exchange 
rate regime). Ten countries were included in the sample of countries operating under 
a currency board: Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Djibouti, Dominica, Estonia, 
Grenada, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Hong Kong and Lithuania. Nine 
countries in the sample linked their currencies to the US dollar and one to the euro 
(Estonia). Other currency board countries were not included in the sample because of 
the lack of data or very short time of their operation. The study covered the period 
from 1970 to 1996. 
Inflation averaged 6% per year in countries with a currency board, which was 
substantially lower than in countries with a flexible exchange rate (50%) and other 
forms of a peg (20%). The results remain unchanged after the adjustment for outliers. 
Controlling for other variables like real income, the growth rate of the money stock, 
the rate of turnover of the central bank governor and the ratio of the sum of exports 
and imports to GDP, the estimated inflation differential remained highly significant. 
The IMF study estimated that a currency board system creates a “confidence effect”, 
amounting to 3.4 percentage point decrease in inflation rate and caused by the very 
existence of a currency board in a country. 
This favourable inflation performance does not seem to have been bought by lower 
economic growth. In the sample of countries operating under a currency board, the 
average annual growth of per capita income was almost twice as high as in all other 
countries. In addition, the volatility of the GDP growth was slightly lower in currency 
board countries than in other countries. 
                                                 
6 See Ghosh, A., A. M. Gulde and H. C. Wolf (1998).   10
These are impressive achievements. Yet, the recent financial crises illustrate that the 
currency board system does not shield countries from speculative attacks, which in a 
number of cases (e.g. Hong Kong) have been quite fierce. Although these countries 
have been able to resist the onslaught of the last crisis, it is unclear that they will be 
able to do so indefinitely. Thus, a currency board remains a fragile construction. This 
fragility will be enhanced when the political pressure to take on a monetary regime 
that makes the country less dependent on a foreign big power accumulates. This 
pressure is likely to increase as countries regain monetary stability. The big challenge 
therefore will be to manage the transition to a new exchange rate regime. 
5. The temptation of capital controls 
We argued that the increasing degree of capital mobility puts countries into the 
uncomfortable situation of having to choose for more flexibility or much tighter 
arrangements. The temptation to avoid such a choice and to find something in the 
middle ground will therefore continue to exist. This will also keep capital controls on 
the political agenda.  
One of the more surprising developments is the strong popularity that the Tobin tax 
has acquired in the political arena. Many parliaments now are voting motions to 
introduce such a tax on a world-wide scale. Most NGOs have made of the Tobin tax 
one of their favourite battling cries against the wicked international speculators.  
Will the Tobin tax allow countries to find a middle ground between the two extreme 
monetary regimes that international capital market integration now increasingly 
imposes on them? This question can be divided into two subsidiary questions:  
•  Is the Tobin tax an instrument to reduce exchange rate volatility for those 
countries that moved in the direction of more flexibility?  
•  Is the Tobin tax an instrument that can make a pegged exchange rate system less 
fragile?  
5.1. The Tobin tax and exchange rate volatility 
Proponents of the Tobin tax have been mesmerised by the large size of the daily 
transactions in the foreign exchange markets. The latest BIS estimates are that these 
could amount to $1.5 trillion. Since exchange transactions arising from exports and 
imports are small, probably not more that 5%, the quick conclusion has been that all   11
the rest is the result of speculative capital flows. The problem with this conclusion is 
that it fails to account for an important institutional feature of the foreign exchange 
market: this is a multi-dealer market in which the largest part of the daily transactions 
are done for purposes of hedging and not of speculation. It has been estimated that 
80% of the daily flows represent hedging activities of dealers (“hot-potato trading”)
7. 
Thus, the Tobin tax will discourage short-term speculators and short-term hedgers. 
Since the latter are responsible for (by far) the largest part of the market transactions, 
it is not obvious that the reduction of hedging activity will tend to reduce the exchange 
rate variability.  
We have to look into the “microstructure” of the foreign exchange market to give an 
answer to the question of how the reduction in the size of hedging activities will affect 
the variability of the exchange rates. This microstructure model can be described as 
follows
8. 
Suppose an individual  speculator buys dollars (sells euro), thereby raising S (the 
price of dollar in units of euro). If there are no dealers, the speculator must find 
another trader willing to hold the euro. In order to find a risk averse trader to hold all 
these euros, the price of euros will have to drop a lot.  
With many dealers we have a different situation. Let us assume a chain of dealers. 
The first dealer obtaining the euros will want to unload them, but not the full amount. 
Because of the drop in the price of the euro the dealer has an incentive to hold a 
fraction of these cheap euros. Suppose, he holds 5%. He then unloads the other 95% 
to another dealer, who has the same incentive to hold a fraction and to unload the 
rest. (This is the hot-potato trading). At the end of the line all the dealers hold a 
fraction of the initial net speculative demand. (Note that the chain will typically be 
shorter because a speculator is likely to be found willing to buy the remaining fraction 
of the euros at the given price). Since each (risk averse) dealer holds only a fraction 
of the initial order flow, he will be willing to accept a smaller price decline of the euro 
than if any one of them had to hold the full order flow. Thus, when there are many 
dealers, the price decline of the euro necessary to absorb the initial order flow will be 
smaller than if there were no dealers
9. 
                                                 
7  See Lyons (2000) on this. 
8  For a formal analysis see Lyons (2000). 
9 Note that this argument is based on the concavity of the utility function: risk premia increase with 
increasing positions in a particular currency.    12
The previous analysis can also be formulated as follows: The existence of many 
dealers is a mechanism that allows spreading risk more efficiently. When a speculator 
buys dollars (sells euros) he forces somebody to take the counterparty risk. When 
there are many counterparties this risk can be spread around more efficiently. 
If one accepts this reasoning one comes to the conclusion that taxing all transactions 
in the foreign exchange market also makes this search for risk spreading more 
difficult. As a result, it is not certain at all that exchange rates will move less. They 
could be moving more.  
Note that the Tobin tax will discourage hedging in the foreign exchange market more 
than pure speculation. The reason is that the search for risk spreading involves 
multiple transactions in the foreign exchange market. For example, assume that the 
initial sale of euros is 100. Each dealer keeps 5% until, say, after five dealers the rest 
is unloaded to another speculator willing to take a reverse position. The chain of 
taxes (assuming a Tobin tax of 1%) will be: 
100 * 0.01 [1 + 0.95 + (0.95)2 + (0.95)3 + (0.95)4]. 
Thus hedging will be taxed by a multiple of the Tobin tax. In this simple example the 
hedging activities are taxed at a rate of 4.5%.  This must have effects on the structure 
of the market. It is likely to eliminate the multi-dealer nature of the market and to 
favour its centralisation, like the one that exists in the stock markets. Such a 
centralisation becomes then another substitute for the efficient spreading of risk. It is 
unclear, however, whether a more centralised market leads to less variability of 
prices. The evidence seems to go in the other direction since centralised asset 
markets experience more price variability (see P. De Grauwe (1996)). 
This change in the market structure will also affect another objective of the Tobin tax 
because it will lead to a large reduction in the size of the daily transactions, as the 
multiple dealer market tends to disappear. Consequently, the objective to raise 
revenues for worthwhile international projects will have to be scaled down 
significantly. 
5.2. The Tobin tax as an instrument to make fixed exchange rates less 
fragile 
Suppose a Tobin tax of 1% were imposed on all exchange transactions. (We do not 
go into the problem of whether such a tax can be implemented in practice. It is quite   13
unlikely that this can be done). Can such a tax protect a country from a speculative 
attack of the kind we have seen in Asia during 1997-98? The answer is that it can’t. 
Speculative attacks on fixed exchange rates are typically driven by expectations of 
relatively high devaluations. Typical orders of magnitude are 20% or more. A tax of 
1% does very little to discourage these speculative attacks. In addition, much of the 
capital movements in a crisis situation is the result of panic
10 whereby investors run 
for the exit door. A Tobin tax of 1% will do little to discourage panic flows
11.  
One can conclude that the Tobin tax will do little to reduce exchange rate volatility, 
nor will it give countries that defend a fixed exchange rate a weapon to ward off 
speculators
12. 
6. Capital mobility and monetary cooperation 
Increased capital mobility induces countries to move in opposite directions in their 
choice of exchange rate regimes. It, therefore, also leads to opposite requirements as 
far as policy co-operation in the monetary field is concerned. Those countries that 
decide to move in the direction of more exchange rate flexibility by the same token 
reduce the need to coordinate their monetary policies. Countries that move towards 
tighter exchange rate arrangements find themselves forced to increase monetary 
cooperation. This is so because in a tightly fixed exchange rate regime (monetary 
union; currency board) the interest rates of the member-countries must be equalised. 
Some rule must therefore be agreed upon the question of how the joint level of the 
interest rate will be decided about. In a monetary union, this requires central bankers 
of the union to sit together and to decide about this jointly. In a currency board regime 
the country setting up a currency board accepts whatever decision the country to 
which it ties its currency decides. No such explicit cooperative  monetary 
arrangements are necessary in a flexible exchange rate system.  
Thus, the net effect of increased capital mobility on the degree of cooperation of 
monetary policies in the world is unclear. It all depends on how capital mobility affects 
the countries’ choices of exchange rate regimes. If the net effect of capital mobility is 
to generalise exchange rate flexibility then the need for cooperation may actually 
                                                 
10 See Radelet and Sachs (1998). 
11  See Tobin (1999) who acknowledges this point. 
12  There may exist other forms of capital controls that are better suited than the Tobin tax to defend 
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decline.  
While all this is obvious as far as monetary policies are concerned, this is not the 
case with fiscal policies. We turn to this issue in the next section by concentrating on 
the question of how the move to a monetary union (like in Europe) affects the need to 
cooperate in the field of fiscal policies. 
7. The need for fiscal policy coordination in a monetary union 
EMU is a quantum jump forward in macroeconomic policy coordination in the EU. 
Since the start of EMU, decisions about interest rates, money stocks and reserve 
requirements have become truly joint decisions. One could not possibly have more 
cooperation in the monetary field. 
The question that arises next is the following. Does the intense cooperation in the 
monetary field require a parallel intensification of cooperation of fiscal policies? In 
order to analyse this question, let us concentrate on two concepts: spillover effects 
and asymmetric shocks.  
8. Spillover effects of fiscal policies and the need to cooperate. 
It is well known that gains from cooperation critically depend on spillover effects. If the 
effects of budgetary shocks in  one country on other countries are important, 
cooperation can improve welfare significantly. When these spillover effects are low, 
there is little welfare improvement to be expected from a budgetary cooperation.  
The crucial question therefore becomes the following. How will the existence of EMU 
affect spillover effects of national fiscal policies? If EMU leads to higher spillovers, 
then more intense fiscal policy coordination is desirable, and vice versa.  
EMU can affect spillover effects of fiscal policies in two ways. First, EMU could lead 
to more intense trade links between the member states. The argument that has often 
been used here is that EMU leads to more price transparency, which intensifies 
competition and opens new possibilities for trade within  the union. This would 
increase the spillover effects of fiscal policies.  Second, EMU will lead to intense 
financial integration. This is already very visible in the bond market. The introduction 
of the euro has made it possible for a large euro-denominated bond market to 
emerge. What is the implication of financial integration for spillover effects of fiscal 
policies? The full integration of the bond markets implies that a fiscal policy action in   15
one country, e.g. a higher budget deficit, increases the interest rate in the euro-bond 
market and therefore affects other countries. This effect is bound to be larger than 
when the bond markets are segmented. Thus, spillover effects through the interest 
rate channel increase.  
The latter analysis has been influential in the design of the stability pact. The fear that 
excessive budget deficits and debt levels in one country would affect other countries 
through the interest rate channel has led to the idea that fiscal policies of the member 
states of the EMU should be tightly controlled.  
One problem has been generally overlooked. Although spillovers through trade and 
interest rates are likely to increase in the EMU, the signs of the impact on economic 
activity through these channels are different. As a result, the total spillover of fiscal 
policies on the output levels of other countries may or may not increase as a result of  
the EMU. This can be easily shown in the context of a simple two-country Mundell-
Fleming model. The intuition is the following. Take a fiscal expansion, let us say in 
France. Because of stronger trade links, it increases output more than before the 
EMU in, let us say, Germany. At the same time, the French fiscal expansion has a 
higher impact on the long-term interest rate in Germany (through the unified euro-
bond market) than prior to EMU. But this leads to a stronger negative effect on 
German output. It is unclear, therefore, that the spillover effects of the French fiscal 
policy on foreign output will increase in EMU. One should also conclude that it is 
unclear whether a more intense coordination of fiscal policies in EMU will increase 
welfare. 
Another way to phrase this result is as follows. The use of fiscal policies creates 
public good effects. Government spending in one country creates benefits in other 
countries. The benefits that spill over to other countries are likely to become more 
important in a monetary union. If, however, the expanding country has to bear full 
costs of financing this increase, it will engage in less government spending than it is 
desirable. Countries will have an incentive to spend too little.  
However, at the same time a monetary union increases the possibility to shift part of 
the financing costs of the expanding country to the other members of the union. This 
effect leads countries to increase their spending too much. Thus, both the benefits 
and the costs spilling over to the other countries tend to become more important. It is 
not clear, therefore, to what extent the monetary union distorts the incentives for   16
individual countries to engage in too little or too much spending; nor is it obvious that 
one needs more coordination of fiscal policies in a monetary union.  
9. Asymmetric shocks and the need to cooperate 
The traditional theory of optimum currency areas has put a lot of emphasis on the 
notion of asymmetric shocks. This theory can be summarised as follows. Asymmetric 
shocks are likely to occur in a monetary union. It is therefore important to have an 
insurance mechanism that will allow individual nations to soften the blow of a 
negative shock on output and employment. Such an insurance mechanism can be 
provided by a unified European budget. By its very nature, such a unified budget 
automatically redistributes from countries experiencing good economic luck to 
countries experiencing bad economic luck.  
If, however, no unified budget is set in place, which is the case in Euroland, the 
prescriptions of the theory are not favourable for the idea of cooperation. In the 
absence of a unified budget, countries have to use an intertemporal insurance 
mechanism to smooth asymmetric shocks, i.e. use the budget deficit in a counter-
cyclical way. This theory leads to the conclusion that in the absence of a unified 
budget, individual nations should use their fiscal policies to absorb asymmetric 
shocks. Therefore, national fiscal policies are tied to national objectives, making it 
very difficult to use fiscal policies in a cooperative way.  
Recent research has stressed, however, that there is an alternative insurance 
mechanism for asymmetric shocks (see Asdrubali, et al.(1990) and Melitz and 
Zumer(1998)). It comes from financial integration. Empirical evidence suggests that 
integrated financial markets are capable of providing insurance against asymmetric 
shocks that is equally powerful as a unified budget. This insight has important 
implications for the EMU, which is likely to intensify financial integration. When 
financial markets are fully integrated, the EMU will function as an insurance 
mechanism against asymmetric shocks, reducing the need to provide insurance by 
budgetary transfers.  
It is unclear, however, whether the insurance against asymmetric shocks provided by 
financial markets is satisfactory. The reason is that it insures the incomes of the 
relatively wealthy in a country hit by a negative shock, leaving the poor and the lower 
income groups with few financial assets unprotected. Modern nation states will want 
to extend the insurance mechanism also to cover these groups. Consequently, a   17
significant part of fiscal policies will c ontinue to be tied up with the provision of 
insurance against asymmetric shocks in a monetary union.  
10. The need for co-operation between the ECB and the budgetary 
authorities 
In the previous section we analysed the need for co-operation between national 
budgetary authorities.  In this section we study the need for co-operation between the 
ECB and the national governments setting fiscal policies.  Here again the key concept 
is spillovers.  Decisions made by the national budgetary authorities affect 
macroeconomic variables (inflation, output).  Since the ECB is trying to control the 
same variables a spillover arises, and co-operation between the ECB and the fiscal 
authorities will generally improve decision making (and welfare). 
There is no doubt that this is theoretically correct.  The issue, however, is whether the 
size of the spillovers is sufficiently important to create significant welfare gains.  Much 
of the literature on the desirable degree of co-operation between monetary and fiscal 
authorities has been based on models in which one monetary authority plays a game 
with one fiscal authority.  In the context of EMU, however, one central bank faces 
eleven (and soon more) national fiscal authorities.  This set-up weakens the case for 
co-operation significantly.  The reason is that the spillover of budgetary policy of one 
country on the ECB is likely to be small.  But differently, if one country, say, France 
follows expansionary budgetary policies, the impact of these policies on the EMU-
wide inflation and output is relatively small because France represents only about 
20% of Euroland’s output.  In addition, France’s actions are likely to be partially offset 
by other countries’ actions.  As a result, the French budgetary policies will interfere 
little with the ECB’s policies.  And the larger Euroland becomes, the weaker are these 
spillover effect, and the less the ECB has to worry about them. Thus, EMU is quite 
different from the US, where the actions of the US federal government are likely to 
have a significant effect on US output and inflation, creating a need to co-ordinate 
monetary and fiscal policy. 
There is another, political, dimension that should be take into account.  Decisions in 
the budgetary field are a prerogative of nationally elected parliaments.  Decisions 
made by these bodies are slow and unpredictable.  Attempts to co-ordinate these 
policies are, therefore, likely to be quite ineffective.  In addition, systematic co-
operation of fiscal policies is bound to reduce the power of national parliaments.  It is   18
unclear whether this is desirable in the absence of steps towards strengthening the 
democratic process at the EU-level. 
To conclude, the following points should be stressed. First, there is already a 
significant amount of co-ordination in the budgetary policy field in the context of the 
stability pact.  The arguments developed here imply that there is little need to go 
beyond the stability pact and to enhance budgetary co-operation in a systematic way.  
This does not mean, of course, that occasional co-operation may be called for, for 
example, when a strong enough common shocks occur. 
Second, our conclusion that further steps towards budgetary co-operation are not 
needed does not imply that co-operation in other fields may not be desirable (e.g. tax 
harmonisation, co-ordination of bank supervision 
11. Conclusion 
The increased mobility of capital of the last few decades creates new challenges for 
the macroeconomic policies of the nation-states. In this paper we have analysed 
some of these challenges. One conclusion from our analysis is the following. Contrary 
to what is often alleged, increased capital mobility does not necessarily increase the 
need for co-ordination of monetary and fiscal policies. The reason is that this 
increased mobility of capital has led many nations to move towards greater exchange 
rate flexibility. And the latter reduces the need to co-operate in the monetary field. 
The effect on the need for fiscal policy co-ordination crucially depends on how 
spillovers of fiscal policies from one country to the other are changed. To the extent 
that capital market integration and trade integration go together we do not know how 
the net spillovers of fiscal policies are affected. 
Increased capital mobility creates many other challenges. We have analysed several 
of these. We argued that while increased capital mobility puts more pressure on 
countries to move away form pegged exchange rates towards either more flexibility or 
more rigidity of the exchange rates, it also increases the temptation to escape this 
hard choice by reimposing capital controls. We argued, however, that one particular 
form of capital controls, i.e. the Tobin tax, is unlikely to succeed in giving countries a 
“Third Way” option.    19
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